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1. ABSTRACT: Taking advantage of the benefits associated with digital means has become a main

priority for ports globally. The effective and smooth integration of Information Technology (IT)
applications and those systems that support the conduct of operations (Operational Technology (OT)
systems), along with the accurate “adjustment” of the human factor elements should be viewed as a
very critical pillar for optimized safe and efficient operations in ports. The afore mentioned
assimilation characterizes cyber-physical systems and entails an extended number of IT and OT
modules, systems and tasks involving various data transmission routes that are advancing in a
technological and operational level alongside plausible cybersecurity threats. These cybersecurity
risks, threats and vulnerabilities are depicted in this article to emphasize the progression of cyberphysical systems in the wider maritime industry and port domains, along with their rising
cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Existing and applicable industry and government standards and
mandates associated with cybersecurity attempt to impose regulatory compliance and increase asset
cybersecurity integrity with reduced emphasis however, in the existing OT (Operational Technology)
components and systems. The use of security risk assessment tools and processes that are used in
other industrial sectors, such as the Security Risk Assessment (SRA) and the Bow Tie Analysis
methods, can support the evaluation of IT/OT infrastructure for cyber-physical security
susceptibilities and then assign suitable reactive measures. The implementation of cybersecurity
safeguards that arise through the implementation of the MITRE ATT&CK Threat Model can enhance
the cybersecurity posture of those assets that support the logistics chain, assuming that they are
intermittently adapted following evaluations for their effectiveness and suitability. Finally, the
improvement of stakeholder communication and cyber-awareness along with the increase in cyberphysical security resiliency can further be aided by the effective convergence of the segregated cyber
and physical security elements of waterside or landside-based IT/OT infrastructure.
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2. INTRODUCTION
Ports, also referred to as seaports, are considered a major part of the critical infrastructure of a
country [1]. Critical infrastructure refers to the framework of infrastructure, man-made networks and
systems that provide needed goods and services to the general public [1]. Ports in turn are defined as the
geographical area where ships are brought alongside the shore to load and discharge cargo [2]. Ports
provide a critical interface between land and sea [2] and sustain a country’s economy and prosperity. In
order for the ports to function efficiently they need to provide more than a safe and secure location for
vessels to discharge or load cargo or for service providers to support maritime operations. A framework
of additional infrastructure is interconnected to a port which creates a complex web of assets, processes,
systems and operations. Ports can include an array of facilities including equipment storage facilities,
fuel storage and refueling terminals, cargo terminals, utility services and infrastructure, industrial
facilities, processing facilities, road and rail transport infrastructure. In order for the ports to be efficient
and provide safe and secure services they also embrace automation in their procedures and systems. IT
(Information Technology)/OT (Operational Technology) components have become indispensable tools
and as more complex equipment and processes are in use, they include a number of SCADA
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) and ICS (Industrial Control Systems) components.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 did initiate a worldwide domino effect in the
development and adoption of a number of security initiatives, directives, standards and policies in ports
and maritime assets in general. Measures for the security and protection of maritime assets and
infrastructure were implemented and the ISPS (International Ship and Port Facility Security) code from
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) was universally adopted. Cybersecurity has been
included in the general concept of security, but as worldwide threats evolve, it needs to adapt and
progress as well.
In 2020 it was reported that cyberattacks on the maritime industry’s OT systems had increased by
900% over the last three years [3]. Since then, further attacks have been reported in ports around the
world. In July 2021 four major ports in South Africa were paralyzed by a major cyberattack which
caused a “force majeure” due to a complete disabling of IT systems [4]. In August 2021 the port of
Houston was attacked by hackers taking advantage of IT system vulnerabilities [4]. The result of such
attacks has always been the financial loss due to diminished operations both at a local and international
level. The deployment of forces, both governmental and private, to mitigate such incidents has also
caused the re-evaluation of vulnerabilities which in turn have led to the investment in additional
resources to reinforce the cybersecurity infrastructure and systems’ posture.
Aiming in exploring the cyber-physical concepts of cybersecurity for ports infrastructure and
realizing the current state of threats in the cyber domain, this paper will provide a concise assessment of
the major attributes of cyber-physical security in the maritime industry to include the sector of ports.
The known security threats and vulnerabilities faced by ports’ infrastructure will also be discussed. An
overview of the major initiatives by the industry and governmental entities aiming in enforcing the
necessary measures at an organizational and operational level, will also be provided. A number of
assessment methods for the evaluation of cyber-physical security threats and vulnerabilities will also be
briefly presented to show the potential of tools available in the industry.
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3. CYBER-PHYSICAL ASPECTS IN PORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND
OPERATIONS
Cyber-physical systems in general pertain to the integration of IT and OT systems along with human
factors [5]. This combination is shown in Figure 1 and represents the majority of operational and
technical components found in ports’ infrastructure. Maritime assets such as ports’ infrastructure are
operated by people and encompass an IT and OT operational and technical element that links procedures,
systems, components, and technical and operational performance [5]. Similar to ships, ports’
infrastructure involves multiple platforms of Systems of Systems (SoS) which contain IT and OT
components, aiming in the automation of processes and optimum efficiency [6]. This architecture of IT,
OT and human operators is further evolving adapting emerging technological features of Industry 4.0,
the Internet of Things (IoT), cloud computing, data analytics, robotics to structure an evolving systems
landscape [7].
The automatic procedures that are carried out in ports include cargo management, supply chain
information exchange, financial transactions and contract management. Maritime security is also
provided in ports for both ships and shore assets and operations. These processes involve communication
with authorities, customs, shipping companies, logistics providers, service providers, ship crews,
customers and other stakeholders. As such communication at a global scale is paramount for business
continuity but also creates challenges for the IT and OT cyber architecture, in achieving the basic
objectives of confidentiality, integrity, and availability for cybersecurity. These challenges need to be
highlighted as they pertain to cybersecurity of IT/OT systems, components and processes that digitally
store, transmit or process data related to operations, financial transactions and personnel management.

IT

OT

Cyber
Physical
Systems

Human
factors

Figure 1: Cyber-physical systems interface.

4. CYBER-PHYSICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
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Cybersecurity risk in the maritime industry relates to plausible threats to the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of systems and digital information and translates to the ever-present
vulnerabilities in IT and OT systems and components. Port components and corresponding risks include
[8]:
a) Facility access: This may involve the degradation or disruption of systems used in cargo,
transportation and personnel management, which may lead to a complete halt of all operations.
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b) Terminal headquarters: This may involve data access by malicious actors aiming to manipulate
sensitive data related to cargo and customers. It may also include the destruction of data through
malware attacks.
c) OT systems: The compromise of OT systems and components such as cargo handling equipment
and fuel systems can lead to operational disruptions, physical damage to cargo and facilities and
increased safety and environmental risks in case of an accident taking place.
d) Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT): Loss of PNT services would lead to disruption to
logistics systems and vessel maneuvering. It could also lead to physical damage to
infrastructure, major safety and environmental incidents such as collisions and allisions, release
of hazardous material, fires, loss of life, vessel sinking, and blocking of a navigable channel.
e) Vessel: The operational and technical compromise of vessel or port facility systems could lead
to the compromise of additional waterside or landside systems. This can occur due to the
interconnectivity of a vessel to shore facilities through Wi-Fi, network connections, USB
storage devices, etc.
In general, similar to physical security, the cyber threats faced by ports’ infrastructure and their
cyber-physical elements can be categorized as internal, external, or colluded [5]. An insider threat can
be an individual, ship crew member or port personnel, that intentionally or unintentionally causes the
breach of preventive cybersecurity measures (such as IT platforms and software tools) by practicing
poor cybersecurity hygiene. From using a virus-infected portable USB device to the reading of malware
infected unsolicited emails, the effects of poor “cyber-hygiene” can be detrimental to ports’ cyber
infrastructure and components. External threats can be defined as those posed by competitors, ordinary
cyber-enabled criminals, hackers, hacktivists, state adversaries or terrorists using highly advanced
techniques to damage, destroy or take control of IT/OT systems [9]. Colluded threats combine the
operation of internal threat actors under the guidance by external adversaries.

5. GOVERNMENTAL AND INDUSTRY INITIATIVES
The combined cyber and physical security for port infrastructure and maritime assets in general is
covered mainly through the more common subject of cybersecurity. Various directives, guidelines,
standards and other publications from the maritime industry and standardization organizations and
various government agencies have been released to tackle the subject. Some of these are described
briefly in the below subsections.

5.1 Maritime Industry Organizations
Cybersecurity to include the cyber-physical domain is covered by Resolution MSC.428(98) [10] and
Guidance MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3 [11] released by the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
MSC.428(98) and MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3 complement the IMO International Ship and Port Facility
Security (ISPS) code for vessels with the application of maritime risk management in vessels’ safety
management systems (SMSs) as required by the ISM (International Safety Management) Code.

5.2 Standardization Organizations
The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has created the NIST Cyber Security
Framework [12] and a series of standards which are widely used in various industrial sectors, including

MARLOG 11

4

Arab Academy for Science, Technology and Maritime Transport
The International Maritime and Logistics Conference “Marlog 11”

Towards a Sustainable Blue Economy
20-22 March 2022
the maritime industry. The NIST Cyber Security Framework comprises of five elements: (1) Risk
identification for cybersecurity of systems, assets, data and operations; (2) The implementation of
safeguards for the cybersecurity protection of assets; (3) Detection of cybersecurity related incidents;
(4) Response to cybersecurity related incidents; (5) Recovery from cybersecurity related incidents. The
NIST Cyber Security Framework is supplemented by other NIST Special Publications 800-30 [13], 80037 [14], and 800-82 [15], that cover the assessment and management of cybersecurity risk for Industrial
Control Systems (ICS). NIST has also published Special Publications 1500-201 [16], 1500-202 [17],
and 1500-203 [18], which consist of the NIST Framework for Cyber–Physical Systems. The NIST
Framework for Cyber–Physical Systems studies the interface of IT and OT systems and components
defining the System of Systems (SoS) state of cyber infrastructure. It also delivers a useful aid for the
evaluation of cyber-physical systems and is applicable to IT/OT systems in the maritime transportation
and infrastructure sectors.
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) have released ISO/IEC 27001 [19] which can be used in the maritime sector as it
assists in the evaluation and management of cybersecurity risks. Published IEC-62443 consist of a series
of standards which cover cybersecurity on industrial communication networks for IT/OT systems. IEC62443-4-2 [20] specifically outlines the requirements for Industrial Automation and Control Systems
(IACS) and presents ways for the management of cybersecurity vulnerabilities. IEC 62443-3-3 [21]
explains the security levels of control systems and ISO/IEC 21827 [22] outlines the Systems Security
Engineering—Capability Maturity Model® (SSE-CMM®), illustrating the procedure for security
engineering for organizations and assets. ISO/IEC 18045 [23] gives guidelines for the assessment of IT
systems security. ISO/IEC 15408-1 [24] covers the evaluation of cybersecurity for IT systems and
components, defining the Target of Evaluation (TOE) concept. ISO/IEC 27032 [25] tackles the security
and protection of critical information infrastructure, data and networks, providing guidance for
cybersecurity reinforcement.
The American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), has issued standard F3286-17 [26] which
utilize the NIST Cyber Security Framework for maritime assets and critical infrastructure and relates to
the mitigation of cybersecurity attacks and the reduction of the impact from such security breach
incidents. ASTM standard F3449-20 [27] provides guidance for the integration of technical and
operational cybersecurity features into vessel safety management systems (SMS), in accordance to the
International Safety Management (ISM) Code and IMO Resolution MSC.428(98).

5.3 Government Agencies
In the USA, the US Congress issued Bill S. 4023 “Enhancing Maritime Cybersecurity Act of 2020”
[28] delegates the implementation of cybersecurity protection strategies and measures to the US Cyber
Security and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Maritime Administration (MARAD). The
US Coast Guard (USCG) issued Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 01-20 [29], titled
“Guidelines for Addressing Cyber Risks at Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) Regulated
Facilities” [29] guides MTSA-regulated facilities for the assessment and management of vulnerabilities
in computer and network systems. NVIC 01-20 promotes the use of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cyber Security and NIST
Special Publication 800-82. The USCG issued Vessel Cyber Risk Management Work Instruction CVCWI-027 (rev.2, 2021) [30], relates to the reduction of cyber risk to the Marine Transportation System
(MTS) through the assessment of cyber risks and vulnerabilities in vessels.
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In the United Kingdom (UK), a Good Practice Guide in Cybersecurity for Ports and Port Systems
(2020) [9] was published by the Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET), the Department for
Transport (DfT), the Defense Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) and the National Cyber
Security Centre (NCSC). This document applies to systems and facilities of ports and encourages the
incorporation of cybersecurity into their general security planning process for infrastructure.
Similarly, the Code of Practice for Cybersecurity for Ships (2017) [31] has also been released, providing
guidance on the management of operational risk due to cyber-related incidents that could impact the
safety and security of the crew, passengers, or cargo of a vessel.
In Europe, the European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) Action Plan (2018) [32]
addresses cybersecurity for the maritime industry with the intent to strengthen and improve the European
Union’s (EU) capacity to manage security and enhance the cyber-defense of maritime infrastructure and
related systems. EU Regulation 2016/679 [33], also known as the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR), safeguards the processing of information for various industry sectors to include the maritime
industry. EU directive 2016/1148/EU [34] and the EU Cybersecurity Act (2019/881/EU) [35] delegate
the operational cybersecurity to the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security
(ENISA) and handle the cybersecurity of IT networks. The European Union has also developed a
cybersecurity strategy through JOIN/2013/01 [36] in order to apply strategic mitigation tools and
policies aiming in the increase of cybersecurity resilience. ENISA has also released related guidance
reports in the subjects of cyber risk management [37] and port cybersecurity [38] for ports.

6. CYBER-PHYSICAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT FOR PORTS
The assessment and management of cyber-physical security for assets within the seaport sector
requires methodologies that can adapt in the operational and technical parameters of such assets. The
maritime transportation sector and its port facilities combine types of operations and assets that fall into
the critical infrastructure sector and combine both industrial, facilities and maritime functions. As such
the assessment of cyber-physical security risks and vulnerabilities in a proactive and reactive manner
needs to adopt methodologies that consider multi-industry technical and operational parameters and
provide an “outside-the-box” perspective. This section will provide a brief overview of some useful
assessment tools that derive from the cyber and physical security domains in general as well as the oil
and gas and industrial sectors.

6.1 API (American Petroleum Institute) Security Risk Assessment (SRA)
The Security Risk Assessment (SRA) methodology derives from the oil and gas sector and is defined
in API (American Petroleum Institute) standard (STD) 780 (2013) [39]. It is applicable for a variety of
security incidents to include theft, sabotage and terrorism for fixed and mobile assets. SRA can be also
applied to various industrial infrastructure and operations including maritime transportation operations.
The API SRA methodology manages security risks through a risk-based, performance-oriented
management process safeguarding the security and safety of assets, the environment, personnel and
business continuity. As per API STD 780 (2013) [39] SRA is a 5-step process which involves: 1) The
asset/facility characterization, 2) The assessment of security threats, 3) The assessment of
vulnerabilities, 4) The evaluation of risk and 5) Risk treatment.
SRA is applicable to cyber-physical security applications in the maritime industry, as it can assess
the physical aspect of security incidents and vulnerabilities as well as the interaction of assets with IT/OT
components and infrastructure. The application of the SRA method for a cybersecurity related incident
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involving a maritime asset has been illustrated by Progoulakis, Rohmeyer and Nikitakos in a recent
publication [5].

6.2 Bow-Tie Analysis (BTA)
Bow-Tie Analysis (BTA) is a qualitative method for safety review and as part of Process Safety
Management (PSM) is used in the petrochemical, and processing sectors. BTA is primarily used in
safety related incidents for the classification of risks, hazards, and consequences in systems, processes
and operations. BTA is also applicable for the identification of security mitigation measures for assets,
their components and processes. Bow Tie Analysis can also be used in the maritime sector, and
specifically for port facilities, for the assessment of interconnections between marine equipment,
systems, and processes in safety and security incidents. For cybersecurity applications, Bow Tie
Analysis can be utilized to assess the appropriate security mitigation measures for IT/OT assets and
processes.
The application of the Bow Tie Analysis method in the cybersecurity of various industrial sectors
has been shown through various publications [40, 41, 42, 43, 44]. Specifically, the use of BTA in a
cyber-physical security scenario for a maritime asset has been proven by Progoulakis, Rohmeyer and
Nikitakos [5]. Bernsmed et al. [45] has also used the Bow Tie Analysis method to analyze cyber-physical
security risks in the maritime sector involving navigational communication systems. Shuang-Hua et al.
[46] has incorporated BTA in a methodology to concurrently assess risks for security and safety of
cyber-physical systems.
As shown in the Bow Tie Analysis (BTA) diagram of Figure 2, cause scenarios are depicted on the
left side of the diagram which represent the pre-event side. Results of plausible consequences and
scenario are depicted on the post-event and right side of the diagram, along with their corresponding
barrier safeguards. The use of the Bow Tie Analysis model showcases the importance of preventive and
recovery actions in dealing with security risk. In Bow-Tie Analysis, risk is specified as the probability
of a Top Event (hazard release) occurring, combined with the severity of the aftermath of the event. In
general Bow Tie Analysis has proved to be an effective method in evaluating cyber and physical security
hazards, risks, consequences, and mitigation measures.

Figure 2 - Bow-Tie Analysis diagram (Source: [47] with information edited by the authors)
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6.3 MITRE ATT&CK Threat Model
The MITRE ATT&CK Threat Model [48] is a vulnerability assessment tool capable of evaluating
cyberattacks and organizational risks [49]. It can be used when assessment cyberattack behavior, tactics,
and techniques of attackers and enables the structure of such data [50] to be utilized by the corporate
Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) and cyber intervention team of the maritime asset. The
MITRE ATT&CK Threat Model is known for its versatility as it enables the evaluation of IT
infrastructure, cloud data storage, portable IT/OT devices, and industrial control systems (ICS) of an
asset [49]. It also allows for the classification and certification of adversary behavior after a confirmed
breach incident while working within IT and OT systems and infrastructure of the maritime asset.

7. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Ending this paper, the following conclusions and discussions points are derived:
(1) The evaluation of presented government and industry directives and standards has illustrated
their inadequacy in covering the OT side of systems in ports infrastructure. Interoperability of
IT and OT systems and the mitigation of credible threats are not tackled in a manner enabling
the asset owners and operators in implementing the necessary measures and practices.
(2) The physical protection of assets, processes and IT and OT components needs to be enhanced
so that credible threats by insider malicious actors are prevented. IT and OT components
vulnerable to mishandling and manipulation need to be secured so that to mitigate potential
cyber threats.
(3) The exploration of IT/OT vulnerabilities needs to be improved by port asset operators and
owners. This can be achieved by the assessment of internal and external processes, stakeholder
communications and IT/OT functions. Through this process existing mitigation measures can
be evaluated, and potential vulnerabilities will be exposed.
(4) The use of available cybersecurity assessment methods from industrial sectors other than the
maritime should be explored. The use of the API SRA method and the BTA method can be
valuable tools in assessing technical and operational risks, vulnerabilities and measures in IT
and OT components and functions. Their combination with the use of the MITRE ATT&CK
Threat Model can enhance the insight of the attackers’ behavior, and tactics and could be applied
to industrial control systems (ICS), IT infrastructure, cloud storage and mobile devices.
(5) Training of port infrastructure personnel, vessel crews and maritime industry operatives in
general should be pursued to a level higher that the current industry standards. It is apparent that
human factors are very important in the integrity or failure of security measures in the physical
and cyber domain of ports’ infrastructure and operations.
(6) It is recommended that the convergence of cyber and physical security for the ports’
infrastructure and vessels is pursued by asset owners and operators. This convergence involving
operations and stakeholder management could improve the implementation of cyber and
physical security policies, cyber risk reduction and threat mitigation.
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